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[1] In 1997, about 140,000 citizens in 388 voting districts in the Swiss canton of Bern
passed a ballot initiative to allocate about 3 million Swiss Francs annually to a canton-
wide river restoration program. Using the municipal voting returns and a detailed
georeferenced data set on the ecomorphological status of the rivers, we estimate models of
voter support in relation to local river ecomorphology, population density, mean income,
cultural background, and recent flood damage. Support of the initiative increased with
increasing population density and tended to increase with increasing mean income, in spite
of progressive taxation. Furthermore, we found evidence that public support increased
with decreasing ‘‘naturalness’’ of local rivers. The model estimates may be cautiously used
to predict the public acceptance of similar restoration programs in comparable regions.
Moreover, the voting-based insights into the distribution of river restoration benefits
provide a useful starting point for debates about appropriate financing schemes.
Citation: Schla¨pfer, F., and P.-J. Witzig (2006), Public support for river restoration funding in relation to local river ecomorphology,
population density, and mean income, Water Resour. Res., 42, W12412, doi:10.1029/2006WR004940.
1. Introduction
[2] There is evidence that degradation of running waters
is at an all-time high [Gleick, 2003]. In the United States,
more than one third of the rivers are listed as impaired or
polluted [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000].
Extinction rates of freshwater fauna are five times that for
terrestrial biota [Sand-Jensen, 2001]. However, river resto-
ration is gaining importance on public policy agendas in
many parts of the world. For instance, Bernhardt et al.
[2005] find that the number of river restoration projects in
the United States increased exponentially during the last
decade, and they estimate that at least $14 billion has been
spent on restoration of streams and rivers since 1990. In
Europe, the costs of restoring the Emscher river system
alone (starting 1990 in a German industrial area) is esti-
mated at C¼ 4.4 billion (Emschergenossenschaft, http://
www.emscherumbau.de). A wide range of values, nature
discourses, historical experiences, and technical expertise
have shaped current restoration efforts [Eden et al., 2000;
Clark, 2004; Rohde et al., 2005; Gowan et al., 2006].
[3] With large and increasing expenditures for river
restoration, an important question concerns also how these
restoration projects should be financed. Appropriate financ-
ing schemes may promote the public acceptance and
perceived success of river restoration. Which level of
government should be responsible? Who should contribute
how much to the financing of river restoration? From a
public finance perspective, answering these questions
requires an understanding of how the social benefits of
river restoration are distributed, both geographically and
across income groups [Bergstrom, 1979; Stiglitz, 2000].
Estimating benefits of river restoration has previously been
approached using survey techniques such as contingent
travel cost methods [Loomis, 2002], contingent valuation
[Hanley et al., 2003], and multiattribute choice experiments
[Collins et al., 2005], although these approaches remain
controversial [e.g., Schla¨pfer and Hanley, 2006].
[4] Another approach to studying the distribution of the
benefits of public services is the analysis of voting behavior
in ballot decisions [Deacon and Shapiro, 1975]. In the
present study, we take advantage of a unique opportunity
afforded by a popular decision on a large river restoration
program in Switzerland. In 1997, about 140,000 voters in
388 districts of the canton (‘‘state’’) of Bern voted on a
proposition to dedicate an annual amount of about 3 million
Swiss Francs (SFR) of the cantonal budget to a fund for
financing a canton-wide river restoration program. The
district-level voting returns together with district-level
socioeconomic data and detailed georeferenced information
on the ecological status of the rivers in the study region
allow us to study the public support for regional (canton-
wide) river restoration in relation to a number of important
municipality-level variables.
[5] The main goal of the present study is to relate voter
support for regional river restoration to the current ecomor-
phological status of the local rivers, and to local mean
income. From a public finance perspective, information
about these relationships is clearly important for policy
design. In countries with multilevel government such
information is also important for assigning political respon-
sibilities and distributing costs in such ways that democratic
decision-making processes and stakeholder involvement
result in an efficient allocation of public funds. In addition,
the analysis examines the role of further demographic and
sociological variables as potential determinants of voter
support for river restoration.
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[6] Using a multiple regression framework, we find that
public support for river restoration increases with increasing
population density, and we also find some evidence that
support increases with decreasing ‘‘naturalness’’ of local
rivers. Furthermore, the results suggest a high income
elasticity of public support (and hence willingness to pay)
for river restoration. The marginal effect estimates can be
used to predict public support for river restoration in other,
economically and culturally comparable regions of
Switzerland, Europe, and elsewhere, and they provide a
rare empirical foundation for the design of acceptable
financing schemes.
2. Conceptual Framework
[7] The present analysis assumes that the nonmarket
benefits derived from rivers are public goods. Voting on
referenda has long been used to characterize the demand for
public goods. The present study starts from the basic
conceptual framework of Deacon and Shapiro [1975]. An
individual i votes in favor of the proposed policy if his or
her expected utility if the referendum passes is increased.
Several studies have related voter support for public poli-
cies to income and various other characteristics of voter
populations [e.g., Deacon and Shapiro, 1975; Kahn and
Matsusaka, 1997; Thalmann, 2004]. These studies have
confirmed that voting can be explained at least partly by
selfish motives, that the support for environmental policies
typically increases with income, and that approval rates are
consistently associated with variables related to the costs a
proposed policy might impose on the voters such as the
extent of employment in particular industries and occupa-
tions. More recently, however, a few important issues in the
economic interpretation of voting behavior have been
raised. In the following, we point to these issues, and we
explain how we cope with them in the present study.
[8] First, the costs of proposed policies to the voters may
arise in many forms, including reduced employment
opportunities or increased prices which are difficult to
evaluate [Schla¨pfer et al., 2005]. Hence many previous
economic analyses of environmental policy referenda such
as those by Deacon and Shapiro [1975] or Fischel [1979]
have provided little information on willingness to pay for
specific public goods. However, there is one particular class
of referenda in which the costs of the proposed policy are
reasonably well defined. In public financing referenda,
citizens vote on whether they should tax themselves in order
to finance a particular public service. The individual tax
burden is clearly defined by the tax schedule according to
which the public revenues for the proposed service are
raised. If this expenditure is relatively small, then its effect
on the prices of other goods and services or on employment
opportunities may be negligible [Schla¨pfer et al., 2005]. One
of the first studies analyzing public support for specific
environmental financing propositions is by Kline and
Wichelns [1994], who examine the determinants of public
support for purchasing development rights to farmland in the
United States; another is by Schla¨pfer and Hanley [2003],
who analyze voter support for landscape amenities manage-
ment in Switzerland. The present study likewise analyzes
voting behavior in a specific public financing proposition.
[9] Second, it has been noted in the public choice
literature that the instrumental utility of casting a well-
considered vote is minimal in mass elections [e.g., Mueller,
2003]. However, studies of voting behavior have consis-
tently shown that voters invest considerable effort in
gathering information or information short cuts such as
political endorsements [Lupia, 1994]. Moreover, norms
appear to promote the private benefits of being informed
and going to the polls [Frey, 1994] and may induce voters
to cast votes as if their vote was decisive [Shapiro and
Deacon, 1996; Mueller, 2003] and as if they were well
informed about the personal consequences of the proposed
policies [Lupia, 1994; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004]. Hence,
as in previous studies, our approach assumes that rational
voters cast ballots in their perceived self-interest and that
the voting decision is reached by comparing the highest
attainable utility under the outcomes of the policy alter-
natives [Deacon and Shapiro, 1975]. However, in light of
the more recent research, voters may be motivated to
gather information and to go to the polls by other than
instrumental aspects, while their votes nevertheless reflect
instrumental values. Furthermore, the voters’ utility func-
tion may include community-wide benefits [Shabman and
Stephenson, 1992, 1996].
[10] Third, there is the issue that, typically, only the
aggregate voting returns of entire voting districts are
available. With such data, it is in general not possible to
make inferences regarding how individual socioeconomic
characteristics such as age, gender, or income affect voting
behavior, unless some very strong assumptions about the
distribution of these characteristics are made. However,
aggregate voting returns are perfectly suited to analyze
how location characteristics such as ambient environmental
quality or local population density determine voter support
of referendum propositions. These effects of local charac-
teristics are the primary interest in the present analysis.
[11] Here, we analyze voter support for a cantonal
referendum proposition to finance river restoration in the
canton of Bern, Switzerland. Conceptually, the aggregate
voting data and georeferenced ecological data set we use
are particularly suitable for studying the spatial relation-
ships between the local ecological status of the rivers and
the benefits of river restoration perceived by local popula-
tions. We hypothesize that local populations do perceive the
ecological status of local rivers, and that this perception
drives their responses to the referendum proposition.
Specifically, we expect that public support for river resto-
ration increases with increasing density and with decreasing
‘‘naturalness’’ of the local rivers. For the latter there are two
reasons: (1) a voter near a low-quality river is likely to have
a high marginal utility for improvement and (2) a low-quality
river is likely to experience greater improvement than a
high-quality river if the referendum passes. We also expect
that public support for the cantonal program increases with
population density. Finally, we examine how local mean
income, geographic regions, and two sociological variables,
language and the recent local experience of floods, are
related to public support, although we do not have clear
expectations regarding the direction of these effect. Since
the public revenues are generated through progressive
income taxes, the sign of the income effect will depend
on whether willingness to pay rises faster (with increasing
income) than the expected tax increase if the referendum
passes.
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[12] We do not try to analyze how further socioeconomic
variables such as education may affect voter support. In
aggregate data, such variables tend to be strongly correlated
with income and thus have little additional explanatory
power. While any observed relationship between voter
support and income cannot be unambiguously causally
related to income, the relationship with income, without
controlling for correlated variables such as population
density, is nevertheless of particular interest as it sheds
light on the relative acceptability of alternative financing
arrangements with more ‘‘progressive’’ or ‘‘degressive’’ tax
implications.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. River Restoration Issue in Switzerland
and Its Cantons
[13] River restoration is a longstanding issue on the
political agenda in Switzerland at both federal and cantonal
levels. On the basis of the federal Law on the Protection of
Water Resources (‘‘Gewa¨sserschutzgesetz’’) of 1991,
passed by popular vote in the same year, the cantons are
responsible for passing and enforcing legislation regarding
the protection and management of water resources in
agreement with the general objectives outlined in the
federal law (article 45). The federal law places great
emphasis on the restoration of water bodies as natural
habitats for plants and animals (article 1). For instance, it
specifically demands that constructions for river channel
stabilization and flood prevention should maintain near-
natural habitats (article 50). Appendix 1 of the by-law of
1998 (‘‘Gewa¨sserschutzverordnung’’), formulates ecologi-
cal goals for surface waters which are to be respected
when stabilization or flood prevention measures are
undertaken. The cantonal efforts are supported by the
federal government with annually about 7 Mio. Swiss
Francs (SFR) for river restoration efforts and another
SFR 13 Mio. for combined restoration/flood prevention
projects (R. Estoppey, Water Division, Federal Office of
Environment, personal communication). Current revisions
of the cantonal laws are expected to define the division of
responsibilities between the cantons and the municipalities
more precisely. As a most recent development (in 2006),
the Swiss anglers association has collected the necessary
number of signatures for a national ballot initiative to speed
up river restoration by the cantons.
3.2. River Restoration Proposition in the
Canton of Bern
[14] In November 1997 the citizens of the canton of Bern
were asked to vote on a proposal to establish a cantonal
fund for river restoration. This fund was proposed in the
context of a revision of the cantonal law on water resources
whose main objective was to adapt an earlier law from 1950
to more modern requirements concerning procedures and
responsibilities.
[15] The need for a revision and modernization of the law
was not contested by any side in the parliament. Only the
use of the cantonal income from water licensing was
controversial. A strong minority of 70 (out of 171)
members of the parliament voted against the revised law,
arguing that an earmarked fund for river restoration should
be established. In the following, a popular initiative spear-
headed by the environmental NGO Pro Natura and the
cantonal anglers’ association formulated a ‘‘Proposition for
a river restoration fund in the water resources law’’. The
initiative specifically proposed to amend the new law by a
provision that 10% of both nonrecurring and annual
cantonal revenues from water licensing, about 3 million
SFR per year, must be used for restoration projects.
According to constitutional provisions, a public referendum
had to be held in which the law passed by the parliament
had to be confronted with the amended version of the law
as demanded by the initiative. The initiative committee
argued that, considering the current state of the rivers, the
‘‘almost symbolic’’ expenditures for river restoration flow-
ing from the ordinary budget were not sufficient for the
task. The opponents of the initiative argued that, consider-
ing the state of the cantonal finances, the budget authority
of the parliament should not be restricted. The parliament
confirmed the preference for its own proposition and hence
recommended (with 88 against 72 votes) to reject the
initiative. The official voter information booklet presented
the issue on seven pages of text which also included a
simple table describing the difference between the two
alternatives and one page listing the arguments of the two
sides. These pages were followed by the original text of the
new law (11 pages) and the proposed amendment (2 pages).
[16] To correctly interpret the voting decision, it is
important to note that the initiative explicitly stated that
water fees would not be increased. This fact was also
highlighted in the official voter information. The only
difference to the parliamentary proposition was that 10%
of the revenues from water licensing would flow into river
restoration projects. The increase of expenditures for river
restoration due to the 10% rule would therefore have to be
balanced by a corresponding increase of the revenues
generated through direct taxation. Clearly, the costs of
increasing expenditures for river restoration would be
distributed according to the tax schedule of the cantonal
taxes on income and wealth.
[17] The mean taxable income in the canton of Bern in
1997 was SFR 50,400. The cantonal tax obligation for
individuals with this income was SFR 4850 per year based
on the tax schedule for singles and SFR 4150 based on the
tax schedule for couples [Canton of Bern, 2000]. The SFR
3 million annual expenditure for river restoration represents
about 0.1% of the canton of Bern’s annual tax income of
about SFR 3 billion [Finance Office of the Canton of Bern,
1998]. Hence the annual costs of the proposed expenditure
for river restoration in the canton of Bern for the mean tax
payer amounted to about SFR 4–5, or about US$ 3–4, per
year. The income taxes in the canton of Bern are weakly
progressive. The annual cantonal income tax burden of an
individual with a taxable income of SFR 100,000 was about
SFR 13,000 and his or her share of the 3 million expendi-
ture was about SFR 13. Neglecting in this calculation the
(relatively minor) taxes on wealth implies the assumption
that the individual shares of the wealth tax are proportional
to those of the income tax.
[18] The total percentage of yes votes among valid votes
in the canton was 54.1% [Canton of Bern, 1997]. The river
restoration initiative thus passed in the popular decision.
The percentage of yes votes in the individual municipalities
is shown in Figure 1. Voter turnout was 21.1%, which is not
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unusual for a Swiss cantonal referendum of relatively
minor importance (see expected tax increase above). As
in any analysis of voting, the results relate to the preferences
of the voter sample. They can only be generalized to the
whole population under the assumption that the sample is
representative.
[19] Following our conceptual framework, we conceive
the approval in the individual voting districts (municipali-
ties) for the cantonal river restoration funding as a function
of (1) the current ecomorphological status of the local rivers
and local river ‘‘quantity’’ or density, (2) mean income in
the local population, and (3) additional variables that
potentially affected the perception of the issue and the
voting decision itself, most notably population density in
the municipalities.
3.3. Definition of Variables
[20] Information describing the spatial configuration and
ecomorphological status of the rivers in the municipalities
of the canton of Bern was available from a detailed
georeferenced data set of the Water and Soil Protection
Laboratory (WSPL) of the Canton of Bern [WSPL, 2003].
These data had been collected in a project initiated in
1997. They contain structural characteristics of the rivers
recorded using methods defined by the Federal Office for
the Environment, Forest, and Landscape (FOEFL) [1999].
Field-recorded attributes characterize the ecomorphological
conditions of homogeneous river segments (Table 1). For
each river segment the data set also provides a Naturalness
Index generated through a scoring of the field-recorded
attributes (Tables 1 and 2). The data are linked to a digital
vector map of the rivers. A comprehensive documentation
of the data set is available from WSPL [2003] and FOEFL
[1999].
[21] A variable RIVNAT for the ‘‘naturalness’’ of the
rivers in the vicinity of the municipal centers was derived
using a geographic information system (GIS). The vector
data set of the rivers was linked with a vector map containing
municipal boundaries and town centers [Swisstopo, 1999a,
Figure 1. Aggregate voting returns in the municipalities of the Swiss canton of Bern.
4 of 10
W12412 SCHLA¨PFER AND WITZIG: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RIVER RESTORATION W12412
1999b, 1999c, 1999d]. Using standard tools in ArcGIS
9.0, the weighted mean Naturalness Index of the river
segments located within a given radius r from the town
centers was computed, yielding the variables RIVNAT1km,
RIVNAT2km and RIVNAT5km (Figure 2). Weighting of
the Naturalness index occurred by river density as defined
as follows. The variable RIVDENSr for the density of
rivers was derived as Lr/Ar, where Lr is the total length of
all river segments located within a given radius r from the
municipal center i (and located within the canton of Bern),
and Ar is the area within this radius that is located within
the canton of Bern. This definition accounts for the fact
that some of the radii overlap with the cantonal boundaries
and information about the ecomorphology of the rivers
outside the cantonal boundaries was not available.
[22] Mean income per taxpayer (INCOME) in the voting
districts (municipalities) was computed from the total of
reported net incomes in the tax period 1997/1998 and the
number of taxpayers (‘‘normal cases and special cases with
a direct federal tax burden’’) which are reported in the
federal tax administration’s publication for the tax period
1999/2000 [Federal Tax Administration (FTA), 2004]. For
population density (POPDENS) we used the population
data of the 1990 census [FTA, 2004] and the land surface
from the Canton of Bern Office for Municipalities and
Spatial Planning (OMSP) [2002]. With both INCOME and
POPDENS we used the log-transformed data as this
specification substantially improved model fit.
[23] A dummy variable DAMAGE for the occurrence of
water related damages (by floods and landslides) was coded
based on the flood and landslide database of the Federal
Research Institute WSL, Birmensdorf [Hegg et al., 2000].
The variable indicates whether a municipality had been a
‘‘main affected municipality’’ of a flood or landslide at least
once during the 10 year period prior to the referendum.
Finally, a dummy variable LANGUAGE (for Germanic
versus Romanic language and cultural background) and
the dummy variables JURA, PREALPS and ALPS (for four
main geographic regions with Swiss Plateau as the refer-
ence) are based on data from the Office of Municipalities
and Spatial Planning, Canton of Bern [OMSP, 2002].
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables (except
the region dummies) are summarized in Table 3.
[24] In eleven cases, the voting districts comprised two
(ten cases) or three (one case) municipalities with small
populations. As votes cannot be spatially related to rivers in
these cases, these municipalities were eliminated from the
data set. For the same reason, the (few) fragmented munic-
ipalities were eliminated from the data set, yielding a data
set with 366 observations.
3.4. Estimation
[25] We used ordinary least squares to estimate the
following model of the logit-transformed approval rates in
the voting districts [Kline and Wichelns, 1994]:
ln F= 1 Fð Þð ¼ aþ b1POPDENSþ b2 log INCOMEð Þ
þ b3 log LANGUAGEð Þ þ b4DAMAGE
þ 3 region dummiesð Þ þ b8RIVDENSr
þ b9RIVNATr þ b10RIVDENSr
 RIVNATr þ e
Indices i = 1,. . ..366 for the municipalities are omitted. In
this equation F is the fraction of approving votes cast in
municipality i; e is a disturbance term, and b1 to b10
indicate the parameters to be estimated. In cases where no
rivers were present within a given radius from the
population center – and hence no value could be computed
for RIVNATr – the observation was omitted from the data
set. This yielded the sample sizes n = 354 (r = 1 km), 365
(r = 2 km) and 366 (r = 5 km). To allow logit transformation
of the dependent variable also in one small municipality
with zero Yes votes, we defined F as the fraction of
approving votes in a municipality +0.01. The interaction
term (last variable in the model) is added because any effect
of river naturalness (RIVNATr) may quite reasonably be
expected to depend on the density of local rivers
(RIVDENSr).
[26] To control for heteroscedasticity we also computed
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and
weighted least squares (WLS) regressions. We used
Table 1. Attributes of River Ecomorphology and Their Scoring in
the Naturalness Indexa
Attribute Description Score
Variability of river width very variable 0.0
Variability of river width moderate 2.0
Variability of river width none 3.0
Bed stabilization none 0.0
Bed stabilization <10% 1.0
Bed stabilization 10–30% 2.0
Bed stabilization >30%, riprap 2.0
Bed stabilization >30%, all other materials 3.0
Stabilization of embankmentb 3.0
Stabilization of embankmentb <10%, permeable 0.0
Stabilization of embankmentb <10%, impermeable 0.0
Stabilization of embankmentb 10–30%, permeable 0.5
Stabilization of embankmentb 10–30%, impermeable 1.0
Stabilization of embankmentb 30–60%, permeable 1.5
Stabilization of embankmentb 30–60%, impermeable 2.0
Stabilization of embankmentb >60%, permeable 2.5
Stabilization of embankmentb >60%, impermeable 3.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb sufficient width, natural 0.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb sufficient width, nonnatural 1.5
Riparian zone/vegetationb sufficient width, artificial 3.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb insufficient width, natural 2.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb insufficient width, nonnatural 3.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb insufficient width, artificial 3.0
Riparian zone/vegetationb no riparian zone 3.0
aSource: FOEFL [1999].
bThe scores of the two riversides were assessed separately and averaged
for the slope and riparian zone attributes.
Table 2. ‘‘Naturalness’’ Classification and Codinga
Sum of Scores Rounded
off to an Integerb Classification Naturalness Indexb
0 and 1 natural or near-natural state 5
2 to 5 slightly impaired 4
6 to 9 strongly impaired 3
10 to 12 artificial state 2
- under ground 1
aSource: WSPL [2003].
bOrder of the scale reversed from the original data set for ease of
interpretation.
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(niFi(1  Fi))1/2 as the weighting variable, where n is the
number of valid votes cast in municipality i [Maddala,
1983]. Hence observations from municipalities with larger
voter populations are given more weight. Weighting is
called for when the individual errors are independent;
because of averaging, the observations from large munici-
palities have smaller errors (are more informative) than the
observations from small counties [Kahn and Matsusaka,
1997]. However, if the within-municipality errors are pos-
itively correlated, as they may be if there are omitted
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables Used in Regressions
Variable Name Description Mean (SD)a Expected Sign
INCOME mean net income of taxpayers in the
municipality (1000 SFR)
52.5 (7.86)) ?
POPDENS number of inhabitants per hectare 2.54 (4.54) +
LANGUAGE dummy variable for local language
(1 = German only; 0 = French)
0.89 (0.37) ?
DAMAGE dummy variable for experience of
flood(s) or landslide(s) 1987–1997
(1 = yes; 0 = no)
0.51 (0.50) ?
RIVDENSr density of rivers within radius r from
the main residential center (km/km2)
r = 1 km: 1.68 (0.87)
r = 2 km: 1.42 (0.65)
r = 5 km: 1.23 (0.52)
+
RIVNATr ‘‘naturalness’’ of the river ecosystems
within radius r from the main
residential center (see Tables 1 and 2)
r = 1 km: 2.87 (0.82)
r = 2 km: 3.09 (0.63)
r = 5 km: 3.23 (0.51)
–
aSD indicates the standard deviation.
Figure 2. Creating variables for local density and ecomorphological status of rivers using a geographic
information system.
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municipality-level variables, then weighting can make
things worse [Kahn and Matsusaka, 1997].
[27] In the analysis of cross-sectional data, spatial auto-
correlation in the error term may result in underestimated
standard errors and thus in incorrect inferences about the
effects of the independent variables [Anselin, 1988].
Introducing dummy variables for districts comprising
groups of municipalities is an effective means to detect
and at least partly remove potential effects of autocorrela-
tion on the standard errors. We therefore also computed
models in which we included a set of dummy variables for
the 26 ‘‘counties’’ (Bezirke) of the canton of Bern. The
parameter estimates obtained for these global within-district
effects were very similar to those of the models without the
district dummies (the significance levels of the river
variables were somewhat better) and are not reported here.
4. Results
4.1. Models of the Logit-Transformed Approval Rates
[28] Table 4 presents the models using the three alter-
native definitions of the local ecomorphological status
(RIVNAT) and density (RIVDENS) of the rivers (with
r = 1 km, r = 2 km and r = 5 km, respectively). Each
model contains the OLS estimates with standard t values
and t values based on White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors as implemented in Limdep 7 [Greene,
1998]. The last column in each model reports the estimates
of the weighted least squares regression (WLS). In pre-
senting the results we follow the order of the variables in
the regression table.
[29] Population density (variable POPDENS) in the mu-
nicipalities was strongly positively associated with the
approval rate in all models (p < 0.01). Mean income in
the municipalities (INCOME) tended to be positively
associated with public support of the initiative for financing
river restoration, although the coefficients were not quite
significant at conventional levels. The coefficient signs
nevertheless show that among the municipalities of the
canton of Bern, controlling for the other variables, higher
mean incomes were associated with slightly higher approval
rates. This result suggests that the income elasticity of
willingness to pay for river restoration is greater than the
income elasticity of the tax schedule [Schla¨pfer et al., 2005].
[30] LANGUAGE (and related Germanic versus Romanic
cultural background) was not consistently related to voter
support. The significantly negative OLS and positive WLS
estimates indicate that Germanic background had a negative
effect on approval among the smaller municipalities only
(which are given less weight in the WLS model). The
occurrence of recent experience of flood damage (DAMAGE)
did not affect voter support for river restoration. The Alpine
municipalities (ALPS) had significantly higher approval
rates than the (Swiss Plateau) reference in all OLS models
(but not in the WLS models where the small municipalities
receive less weight). This result can potentially be
explained by an expectation in Alpine municipalities that
river restoration projects would also serve flood control
objectives.
[31] The quantity of local rivers within a certain distance
from the population centers (RIVDENSr) was not signifi-
cantly related to the approval rates, except in the WLS
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model with r = 5 km. The naturalness of local rivers
within a certain distance from the population centers
(RIVNATr) was negatively associated with the approval
rate in the standard OLS model with r = 1 km. The
interaction of RIVNATr and RIVDENSr was significantly
negative in the WLS models with r = 2 km and r = 5 km
and in the OLS-Het. model with r = 5 km. In all other
models the (negative) coefficients on RIVNATr were not
significant at conventional levels. Hence higher ‘‘natural-
ness’’ of the local river was associated with lower approval
rates, but with ‘‘local’’ defined by r = 2 km and r = 5 km this
effect came through the interaction of naturalness with the
local density of rivers. This result suggests that at greater
distances from the centers the effect of ecomorphological
status depended on river density.
[32] The R2 values indicate that the proportion of the
variance explained by the regressions is relatively small
(about 16 to 18% in the OLS and 27% in the WLS models).
Adding the ‘‘river variables’’ increased the proportion of
explained variance by about 1.7% (Table 4; WLS model
with r = 5 km). Potential reasons for the limited explanatory
power of the models include the financing by ways of a
progressive tax which may have prevented a sharp division
of approval rates along the income variable. Furthermore,
the relatively homogeneous spread of the river system over
the entire canton may have prevented sharper regional
differentiation of voter support [cf. Deacon and Shapiro,
1975]. (Including dummy variables for the 26 districts
increased the proportion of explained variance by about
10%.)
4.2. Marginal Effects
[33] Table 5 presents a series of linear models explaining
the (untransformed) percentage of approval of the river
restoration proposition. The linear specification allows the
coefficients to be interpreted as the marginal effects of
changes in the independent variables on the percentage
approval. Model 1 includes all independent variables of the
previous models, except the interaction term. When the
untransformed variables POPDENS and INCOME are
entered in the model, both POPDENS and INCOME are
highly significant, and the negative coefficient on river
naturalness is also significant in both the OLS-Het. and
the WLS model. Model 2 includes the significant variables
of Model 1 (WLS), except DAMAGE which did not remain
significant when the other variables were dropped. Model 2
thus represents a rough-and-ready formula to predict the
percentage approval in the municipalities of the canton of
Bern. (Depending on whether one prefers the estimates to
be heavily determined by the larger towns or not, the WLS
or the OLS estimates may be used. Hence, on the basis of
the OLS estimates for instance, the percentage approval of
the $4 per capita and annum program for river restoration
in the canton of Bern is given by:
Percentage Yes ¼ 44:3þ 0:25 * POPDENSþ 0:17 * INCOME
þ 2:4 * LANGUAGE 2:0 * RIVNAT2km
Thus a ceteris paribus increase of mean income in a
municipality by about CHF 1000 (or 2% at the mean of the
municipalities’ mean incomes) was associated with an
increase of the approval rate by 0.17 percentage points.
Hence a 20% (CHF 10,000) increase in mean annual
income was associated with an increase of the approval
rate by about 1.7 percentage points (e.g., from 54 to
55.7% approval). An increase of mean population density
by 1 person per hectare increased approval rates by
0.25 percentage points. German language increased
approval rate by 2.4 percentage points, and an increase
of the mean river quality index by 1 point of the 5-point
scale was associated with a reduction of the approval rate
by 2 percentage points.
[34] Finally, Model 3 only includes INCOME and RIV-
NAT2km, both highly significant. This model is of particular
interest from a financing perspective (see also Conceptual
framework, last paragraph). First, the income coefficient
indicates if support increases with income – given the
existing tax schedule. This simple information is of interest
Table 5. Estimates of Marginal Effects (Linear Models)a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OLS Het. WLS OLS Het. WLS OLS Het. WLS
Constant 42.06b (6.85) 44.70b (10.62) 39.19b (6.58) 44.33b (11.48) 38.78b (6.76) 48.98 b (12.91)
INCOME 0.29b (3.41) 00.15b (2.90) 0.29b (3.74) 0.17b (3.43) 00.35b (4.62) 0.22b (4.51)
POPDENS 0.32b (3.02) 00.20b (2.91) 0.35b (3.55) 0.25b (3.73) — —
LANGUAGE 1.97 (0.83) 2.68c (2.22) 0.00 (0.00) 2.42c (2.15) — —
DAMAGE 1.21 (1.01) 1.65d (1.77) — — — —
JURA 3.27 (1.40) 0.93 (0.65) — — — —
PREALPS 1.41 (0.91) 1.02 (0.73) — — — —
ALPS 1.21 (0.47) 2.63 (1.45) — — — —
RIVDENS2km 0.68 (0.73) 1.03 (1.38) — — — —
RIVNAT2km 2.05c (1.83) 1.56c (1.97) 1.97d (1.95) 1.99b (2.79) 2.53c (2.55) 3.34b (5.00)
n 265 365 365
R2 0.129 0.213 0.116 0.201 0.100 0.148
R2adj. 0.107 0.193 0.106 0.192 0.095 0.143
aThe dependent variable is the percentage of approving votes. Abbreviations: OLS, ordinary least squares; OLS Het., standard errors based on White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix; WLS, weighted least squares. T values are in parentheses.
bSignificant at p < 0.01.
cSignificant at p < 0.05.
dSignificant at p < 0.1.
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because financing schemes for river restoration can account
of how ‘‘fast’’ willingness to pay increases with income
(while they cannot discriminate between, say, language
groups or urban-rural differences in preferences). Second,
the significant (negative) coefficient on RIVNAT2km
suggests that naturalness is perceived as a local public
good. The less natural local rivers were associated with
greater public support for restoration. This suggests that
(some) local participation in financing may be acceptable.
5. Conclusion
[35] The present empirical analysis based on georefer-
enced ecomorphological data, census data and aggregate
voting returns suggests that population density was the
main factor driving public support for river restoration in
the municipalities of the Swiss canton of Bern. We further
found evidence that the ‘‘naturalness’’ of local rivers
derived from a set of ecomorphological attributes can be
perceived by local populations and that this perception can
affect local support for (regional) river restoration. Hence
river restoration in the canton of Bern can tentatively be
characterized as a public good with partly local benefits,
and with a pronounced urban-rural difference in preferen-
ces. Given a progressive relevant tax schedule, the slightly
positive association of approval rates with municipal mean
income suggests a high income elasticity of willingness to
pay.
[36] Other factors that were not of primary interest in the
present study – but important as control variables – also
appeared to determine the outcome of the vote. The
geographic regions and language (with related cultural
background) appeared to have some influence on the vote,
although these effects depended on the size of the munic-
ipalities. While the dummy variable for recent experience of
floods was not significant in the analysis, it cannot be
excluded that a more sophisticated construction of the
variable would have yielded different results.
[37] A main caveat regarding these results follows from
the fact that our analyses using aggregate voting data
explained only a limited proportion of the variation of
aggregate voter support in the municipalities. While we
argue that the analysis with respect to the factors income
and local ecomorphological status of the rivers is of
particular interest from a policy perspective, we suggest
that the large proportion of unexplained variance invites
further study. Important further local factors may have
systematically influenced the perception of the ballot
proposal in addition to those identified in the present
study.
[38] From a public finance perspective, information about
the distribution of public support of river restoration is
clearly important for the design of efficient and widely
acceptable policies. Moreover, if the goal is to promote
efficient allocation and local identification through feder-
alistic implementation, such information is important for
assigning tasks and responsibilities to appropriate levels of
government. The negative association of approval rates and
river naturalness suggests that river restoration has a local
benefit component. With regard to policy, this would
suggest that efficient allocation may be pursued through a
system of matching grants from the cantonal government
and local jurisdictions actively participating in decision
making and financing. When population density was
dropped from regression models, mean income at the
municipality level was strongly positively associated with
aggregate approval rates – in spite of the progressive
relevant tax schedule. With regard to financing schemes
this result clearly suggests that financing through progres-
sive taxes may be most appropriate. We suggest that our
findings from the canton of Bern may be useful to inform
river restoration in other Swiss cantons and perhaps other
economically and culturally comparable regions.
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